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How	to	design	and	price	information	for	sale	to
others
Everyone	seems	to	be	talking	about	“big	data”	these	days	—	what	it	is,	where	it	is,	why	it’s	important,	who	owns	it
and	how	to	mine	it.	It’s	like	a	gold	rush	with	numerous	prospectors	jumping	into	the	game,	dreaming	of	striking	it
rich	and	cornering	a	market	before	others	discover	the	location	and	size	of	their	mine.	But	there’s	one	small
problem:	The	prospectors	often	don’t	quite	know	what	they’re	doing	when	it	comes	to	pricing	and	selling	their	bag
of	gold	dust	—	or	in	the	case	of	data	miners,	their	trove	of	digital	data.
They’re	not	as	prepared	as	they	should	be	when	they	finally	confront	a	buyer	with	inside	market	and	other
business	information	unbeknownst	to	the	seller.	The	result:	The	seller	doesn’t	make	as	many	sales,	or	as	much
profit,	as	hoped	and	desired.	Of	course,	today’s	major	data	miners	—	such	as	Acxiom,	Facebook,	Google,	credit-
rating	agencies,	and	other	major	data	miners	that	jump	to	mind	—are	anything	but	naive	sodbusters	who	threw
down	their	plows	for	pickaxes.
They’re	incredibly	sophisticated	tech	companies,	at	heart,	that	know	what	they’re	doing	and	where	to	look,	and
collect,	potentially	fascinating	and	lucrative	digital	data	that	corporate	buyers	might	find	valuable	about	their
customers,	products	and	overall	market	prospects.	But	what	amazes	us	is	how	little	companies	truly	know	about
how	to	actually	design	and	price	information	for	sale	to	others.
Information	isn’t	like	your	proverbial	widget	that	a	buyer	either	needs	or	doesn’t	need.	Information	is	more	fluid,
more	abstract	—	and	it’s	important	for	sellers	to	understand	that	not	all	data	buyers	and	their	needs	are	the	same.
Some	buyers	have	partial	information	about,	say,	the	online	shopping	patterns	of	their	customers,	while	other
buyers	are	relatively	clueless	about	these	patterns.	How	do	you	price	information	for	such	disparate	buyers	of
information?
That’s	one	of	the	questions	we	sought	to	answer	when	we	first	started	research	that	ultimately	led	to	our	new
study.	On	the	surface,	what	we	found	in	our	research	appears	to	be	basic	common	business	sense	when	it
comes	to	selling	just	about	any	product:	offering	multiple	versions	allows	the	seller	to	segment	the	market	and
increase	profits.	But	in	order	to	develop	a	better,	more	structured	and	quantitative	framework	to	analyze	the	sale
of	information,	one	must	take	into	consideration	the	uncertainties	a	data	buyer	faces	when	seeking	information—
and	then	customise	a	data	product	to	those	needs.
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Think	of	it	in	terms	of	today’s	cable	companies’	selling	different	“tiers”	of	services	and	programming	to	home
viewers	–	such	as	“basic,”	“premium,”	“super-premium”	or	“super-duper	premium”	plans,	or	whatever	they	call
their	tiered	cable	packages	these	days.	What	if,	as	we’re	now	learning,	those	broadly	defined	cable	tiers	are	not
adequate	for	many,	if	not	most,	cable	customers?
The	trick	with	big	data,	we’ve	found,	is	that	sellers	need	to	better	screen,	sometimes	on	an	individual	basis,
exactly	what	potential	buyers	and	sellers	need	—	including	whether	they’re	“high-end”	buyers	or	“lower-end”
buyers.	Not	only	that,	sellers	themselves	have	to	better	mine,	and	then	analyse,	their	own	information	that	they’ve
gathered,	and	offer	up	new	and	better	customised	products	to	customers.
In	the	case	of	credit-rating	firms,	sellers	have	different	levels	of	information	that	they	offer	to	banks,	such	as	basic
“red-flag”	products	about	the	credit	histories	of	loan	applicants.	But	they	can	also	sell	more	detailed	information,
such	as	alerting	banks	of	any	late	payments	or	bankruptcy	filings	by	borrowers	after	their	loan	applications	have
been	approved.	That’s	extremely	specific,	and	valuable,	information	to	banks.
The	key	with	partial	packages	is	to	be	systematic	in	the	type	of	mistakes	a	buyer	of	an	incomplete	data	set	may
incur,	having	decided	to	miss	out	on	the	full	information	available	from	the	seller.	For	example,	lenders	who	fail	to
acquire	all	available	red	flags	might	give	a	loan	to	an	unworthy	borrower,	but	no	good	applicant	is	ever	turned
down	because	of	it.
When	selling	information,	it’s	absolutely	critical	not	to	clutter	up	customised	packages	with	“noise”	that	will	merely
degrade	the	product	(as	in	the	case	of	lower	battery	life	for	Tesla	vehicles).	Moreover,	the	optimal	number	of
customised	packages	is	limited	by	the	complexity	of	buyers’	needs	—	if	buyers	need	data	to	assist	with	simple
decision	problems,	the	seller	should	offer	just	a	few	partial	packages,	even	if	buyers	are	very	diverse.
The	bottom	line	is	that	data	sellers	can	indeed	sell	comprehensive	packages	of	data	to	corporate	buyers	—	but
they	better	be	prepared	to	sell	partial	packages	of	data	as	well,	tailored	to	the	needs	of	individual	buyers.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	The	Design	and	Price	of	Information,	forthcoming	in	the
American	Economic	Review.	
The	post	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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